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Abstract
We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set
of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. e class we consider
includes all auctions that allocate each item independently to the agent that submits the highest bid for
it, and requests a payment that depends on the bids of all agents only for this item. Two well-known
examples of this class are the simultaneous first and second price auctions. We focus on the pure
equilibria of the induced strategic games, and using the liquid welfare as our efficiency benchmark,
we show an upper bound of 2 on the price of anarchy for any auction in this class, as well as a tight
corresponding lower bound on the price of stability for all auctions whose payment rules are convex
combinations of the bids. is implies a tight bound of 2 on the price of stability of the well-known
simultaneous first and second price auctions, which are members of the class. Additionally, we show
lower bounds for the whole class, for more complex auctions (like VCG), and for seings where the
budgets are assumed to be common knowledge rather than private information.
1 Introduction
We study the efficiency of auctions for the allocation of a set of discrete items to a set of budget-constrained
agents with combinatorial preferences over the items, expressed via valuation functions. Such combinato-
rial auctions have been studied extensively in seingswithout budget constraints, through the lens ofmech-
anism design [Dobzinski, 2011, 2016; Feldman et al., 2015] and equilibrium analysis [Christodoulou et al.,
2016a; Bhawalkar and Roughgarden, 2011; Feldman et al., 2013], under various assumptions about the
structure of the valuation functions [Lehmann et al., 2006]. While designing approximately optimal and
truthful auctions is important, such an approach is usually restricted by impossibility results and also
leads to auctions with complicated allocation and payment rules. In this paper we follow the alternative
approach of using much simpler auctions, like the simultaneous first and second price auctions, where every
agent submits a scalar bid per item, each item is allocated to the agent that submits the highest bid for it,
and the winner of every item either pays her own bid (first price) or the second highest bid (second price).
However, such auctions are non-truthful and naturally induce strategic games among the agents who typ-
ically act as utility-maximizing players and strategize over their bids. e objective then is to quantify the
efficiency loss at equilibrium due to the strategic behavior of the agents, by bounding the price of anarchy
[Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999] and the price of stability [Anshelevich et al., 2008] in terms of some
social efficiency benchmark.
Most of the related literature on auctions makes two main assumptions about the characteristics of the
agents and the efficiency benchmark. First, the agents are assumed to have no budget constraints, and are
therefore able to afford any payment as long as they get non-negative utility. However, such an assumption
is clearly non-realistic. Even though an agent might have high value for a set of items, she may not have
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the necessary liquidity to actually pay for them. erefore, it is more natural to instead consider seings
where the agents may have budget constraints that limit their ability to pay. Second, social efficiency is
measured by the social welfare benchmark, defined as the total value of the agents for the items they are
allocated. While this might be true if we assume that the agents do not have budget constraints, when
budgets do exist, it is not hard to see that the social welfare achieved at equilibrium can be arbitrarily far
away from the maximum possible; consider the following example with just two agents and one item.
Example 1. Assume that there is one item, and two agents with values (λ > 2, 2) and budgets (1, 2).
Since the second agent has more budget than the first agent (2 vs. 1), she can always outbid the first agent
and get the item. is leads to an allocation with social welfare 2. However, the optimal allocation is to
give the item to the first agent for a social welfare of λ. erefore, there is a huge gap between the welfare
at equilibrium and that of the optimal allocation if λ is large.
erefore, the social welfare is clearly not the correct benchmark in seings with budget constraints.
Instead, we use the liquid welfare benchmark, which takes the budgets of the agents into account. Similarly
to the social welfare, the liquid welfare of an allocation is defined as the total value of all agents, but with
the value of each agent capped off by her budget (i.e., we take the minimum between the agent’s value and
her budget). Observe that for this benchmark the equilibrium allocation of Example 1 is now the optimal
one. e liquid welfare benchmark was first proposed independently by Dobzinski and Paes Leme [2014]
and Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013], who called it effective welfare. Dobzinski and Paes Leme showed that the
well-known VCG auction [Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973] is no longer truthful, and designed
truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal liquid welfare for seings with divisible items. On
the other hand, Syrgkanis and Tardos compared the social welfare at equilibrium to the optimal liquid
welfare, for games induced by a plethora of auctions, ranging from single-item and multi-unit auctions to
combinatorial ones.
e price of anarchy in terms of the liquid welfare, termed liquid price of anarchy, has been stud-
ied in a series of papers by now. To start with, the papers by Caragiannis and Voudouris [2016] and
Christodoulou et al. [2016b] focused on the proportional allocation mechanism, used for the allocation of
divisible resources, and were the first to formally bound the liquid price of anarchy. Following their work,
Caragiannis and Voudouris [2018] characterized the structure of worst-case pure equilibria and proved
tight bounds on the liquid price of anarchy for almost all divisible resource allocation mechanisms. In a
similar spirit, Voudouris [2019] showed tight bounds on the pure liquid price of anarchy and stability for
ad auctions, including the generalized second price auction and VCG. Our work is mostly related to that
of Azar et al. [2017] who showed a constant bound on the liquid price of anarchy of simultaneous first and
second price auctions for Bayes-Nash equilibria when the agents have additive valuation functions, and
a tight bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy for pure equilibria when the agents have fractionally-
subadditive valuations. Among other results, in this paper we extend the second main result of Azar et al.
[2017] to the class of subadditive valuation functions, which contains that of fractionally-subadditive, and
further show that the bound of 2 in fact holds for the liquid price of stability, and for many more simple
combinatorial auctions.
1.1 Our contribution
We consider a combinatorial seing, where a set ofm discrete items are to be allocated to a set of n budget-
constrained agentswith subadditive valuation functions. For the allocation of the items, we consider simple
combinatorial auctions, which work as follows: every agent submits a bid per item, receives every item for
which she submits the highest bid, and also pays an amount that is a function of the bids of all agents for this
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itemonly; such auctionswere considered before by Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2012] in seingswithout
budget constraints. We focus on the pure equilibria of the strategic games induced by such auctions, and
study their social efficiency, by bounding the liquid price of anarchy and stability; that is, we bound the
worst-case ratio between the liquid welfare achieved by any possible allocation and the liquid welfare in
the worst and the best equilibrium, respectively.
By carefully exploiting techniques developed by Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2011] and Feldman et al.
[2013], we show an upper bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy of all simple combinatorial auctions
whose payment rules satisfy some mild assumptions; see Section 3. We complement this upper bound
with a corresponding lower bound of 2 on the liquid price of stability for auctions whose payment rules
are convex combinations of the bids, and a lower bound of 2 − 1/n − (n − 1)/m for all simple auctions
with n players andm items. As a corollary, we obtain that the liquid price of stability of simultaneous first
and second price auctions with subadditive agents is exactly 2, thus extending the corresponding bound
of Azar et al. [2017] for fractionally-subadditive agents; these results can be found in Section 4. We also
consider more complex auctions, which take into account the bids for all items when deciding the allo-
cation and the payments, and show that even the most prominent such auction, VCG, has liquid price of
anarchy at least 2; see Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we consider the case where the budgets are common
knowledge, instead of private information. While one would expect that this extra power could lead to an
almost fully efficient simple auction, we actually show that this is not true, by presenting a lower bound of
4/3 − 2/(3m) on the liquid price of anarchy of any simple auction. We conclude the paper by discussing
possible directions for future research in Section 7.
1.2 Other related work
e related literature on auction theory is extensive. We refer the interested reader to the survey of
de Vries and Vohra [2003] and the chapter of Blumrosen and Nisan [2007] for a broad introduction to com-
binatorial auctions, as well as to the survey of Roughgarden et al. [2017] for an overview of the work on
the price of anarchy in auctions.
ere has been a lot of recent work on auctions with budget-constrained agents. Lu and Xiao [2015,
2017] extended and also generalized the work of Dobzinski and Paes Leme [2014]. Fotakis et al. [2019]
showed how truthful auctions which approximate the social welfare in submodular valuation seings
without budget constraints can be adapted to seings with budget constraints, so that they remain truthful
and also now achieve almost the same approximation for the liquid welfare. In a slightly different context,
Braˆnzei et al. [2017] viewed the liquid welfare as an upper bound on the maximum possible revenue and
designed truthful mechanisms for revenue maximization, while Braˆnzei and Filos-Ratsikas [2019] studied
similar questions for the best-response dynamics in games induced by envy-free pricing mechanisms.
e liquid welfare has also been considered in other seings with budget constraints, including loery
pricing equilibria [Dughmi et al., 2016], online multi-unit auctions [Eden et al., 2019], and preferred deals
for impression sales [Deng et al., 2019].
2 Preliminaries
ere are m items to be allocated to n players. Each player i has a valuation function vi : 2
m → R≥0
and a private budget ci ∈ R≥0. e valuation function returns the value of player i for every possible
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subset (or, bundle) of items1 that can be given to her, while the budget restricts the payments that she can
afford. To shorten our notation in the case of singleton bundles, we will write vi(j) instead of vi({j}). We
assume that the valuation functions are monotone and subadditive. Let S and T be two bundles of items.
A valuation function vi is
• monotone if S ⊆ T implies that vi(S) ≤ vi(T ),
• additive if vi(S ∪ T ) = vi(S) + vi(T ),
• fractionally-subadditive if there exists a family of additive functions {ν1, ..., νk} such that vi(S) =
maxℓ{νℓ(S)}, and
• subadditive if vi(S ∪ T ) ≤ vi(S) + vi(T ).
e class of additive valuation functions is a subset of the class of fractionally-subadditive functions, which
in turn is a subset of the class of subadditive functions. erefore, in this paperwe consider themost general
class of structured valuation functions.
We consider a class of simple combinatorial auctions S for the allocation of the items to the players.
Every player i submits a vector of bids bi = (bij)j∈[m] consisting of a bid bij ∈ R≥0 per item j ∈ [m]; let
b = (bi)i∈[n] be the matrix consisting of the bids of all players for all items, and let b[j] = (bij)i∈[n] be
the vector consisting of the bids of all players only for item j. Every auction in S allocates independently
each item j to the player π(j) that submits the highest bid for it (bπ(j),j ≥ bij for every i ∈ [n]), and also
requests a payment of pj(b[j]) ∈ [0, bπ(j),j ] from player π(j).
2 We assume that the payment function is
non-decreasing and continuous in every bid.
Example 2. e two most prominent members of S are the simultaneous first and second price auctions
(SFPA and SSPA). In SFPA the winner of each item has to pay her own bid, while in SSPA the winner has to
pay the second highest bid for the respective item. Both of these auctions clearly satisfy our assumptions
about the payment functions: the payment is at most the bid of the winner, and increasing the bids cannot
decrease the price. In fact, any auction that defines the payment to be a convex combination of the bids is
a member of S .
Let X(b) denote the allocation that is the outcome of the auction when given as input the bid matrix
b, according to which player i gets a bundle of itemsXi such that ∪iXi = [m]. e utility of player i for
the outcome of the auction is then defined as
ui(b) = vi(Xi)−
∑
j∈Xi
pj(b[j])
if her total payment does not exceed ci, or −∞ otherwise.
e players are utility-maximizers and strategically select the bids they submit to the auction. is
strategic behavior defines a game G among the players. We say that a bid matrix b is a pure Nash equilib-
rium (or, simply, equilibrium) if no player has incentive to deviate to a different bid strategy, that is,
ui(b) ≥ ui(y,b−i),
1e players are assumed to have access to their valuation functions via demand queries; such a query takes as input a bundle
of items and returns the value of the player for this bundle.
2In case there are two or more players with the highest bid for an item, then such an item is arbitrarily given to one of these
players; this captures the case where all bids for an item are equal to zero.
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for every player i and bid vector y 6= bi. We use the notation (y,b−i) to denote the matrix that is
obtained aer replacing the entries of b corresponding to bi by y. Let EQ(G) be the set of all equilibrium
bid matrices of game G.
e liquid welfare of an allocationX is the total value of all players, such that the value of each player
is capped off by her budget, that is,
LW(X) =
∑
i∈[n]
min{vi(Xi), ci}.
e pure liquid price of anarchy of an auction is the worst-case ratio (over all possible games induced by the
auction) between the optimal liquid welfare achieved by any allocation and the minimum liquid welfare
at equilibrium:
LPoA = sup
G
maxY LW(Y)
minb∈EQ(G) LW(X(b))
.
Similarly, the pure liquid price of stability of an auction is the worst-case ratio (over all possible games
induced by the auction) between the optimal liquid welfare achieved by any allocation and the maximum
liquid welfare at equilibrium:
LPoS = sup
G
maxY LW(Y)
maxb∈EQ(G) LW(X(b))
.
Clearly, LPoA ≥ LPoS ≥ 1, and hence any upper bound on the LPoA is also an upper bound on the LPoS,
while any lower bound on the LPoS is also a lower bound on the LPoA. Furthermore, observe that an upper
bound on the LPoA for the class of subadditive valuation functions is also an upper bound on the LPoA for
any hierarchically lower class of valuation functions (additive and fractionally-subadditive), while a lower
bound on the LPoA for the class of additive valuation functions is also a lower bound on the LPoA for any
hierarchically higher class of valuation functions (fractionally-subadditive and subadditive). ese hold
for the LPoS as well.
We finally assume that the players are rational and behave conservatively to avoid geing negative
utility: the sum of bids they submit for any bundle of items does not exceed their value for this bundle nor
their budget, that is, ∑
j∈Xi
bij ≤ min{vi(Xi), ci}.
Besides being a natural assumption that has been extensively considered in the related literature, this
restriction is also necessary in order to have meaningful bounds on the liquid price of anarchy.
Example 3. In SSPA, it might happen that players with very small value or budget submit bids that are
extremely large, and end up being the high bidders for some items. is may further lead to an equilibrium
where the other players are discouraged enough to submit bids of zero for these items (even though they
may have high value for them, as well as budget), leading to a payment of 0, but also to an allocation with
very low liquid welfare. Observe that such situations cannot appear in SFPA since the players have to pay
their own bids in case they win, and are therefore conservative by definition.
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3 Upper bounds for auctions in S
Here, we will show an upper bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy of every auction in S . We start by
focusing only on one arbitrary player i and a given set of items S. By considering the unilateral deviation
of i to a particularly defined bid strategy over S, we prove two different bounds on the overall contribution
of i to the liquid welfare of the allocation that assigns S to i, when the strategy leads to a total payment
within i’s budget and when the payment exceeds the budget. ese bounds will be used later to show the
upper bound of 2 (eorem 2), by partitioning the players into two sets depending on their contribution
to the liquid welfare of the equilibrium. e proof of the next lemma carefully exploits ideas developed by
Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2011] and Feldman et al. [2013] to bound the price of anarchy for the case
of SFPA and SSPA without budget constraints.
Lemma 1. Consider a player iwith a subadditive valuation function vi and budget ci. Let S be a set of items,
and b−i be the bid matrix containing the bids of the other players ℓ 6= i for all items. en, there exists a bid
vector yi = (yij)j∈[m] such that the utility of player i when she unilaterally deviates to yi is
ui(yi,b−i) ≥ min{vi(S), ci} −
∑
j∈S
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj,
if her total payment does not exceed ci. Otherwise,
min{vi(S), ci} <
∑
j∈S
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj .
Proof. Let T be a maximal subset of S such that vi(T ) ≤
∑
j∈T maxℓ 6=i bℓj . We define the deviating bid
vector yi = (yij)j∈[m] to be such that
yij =
{
maxℓ 6=i bℓj + δ, if j ∈ S \ T
0, otherwise,
for any δ > 0. Since the payment function of the auction is continuous, player i definitely wins every
item j ∈ S \ T , even for values of δ that are infinitesimally close to zero. Hence, in the rest of the proof,
without loss of generality, we set δ = 0.
Before we continue, we argue that for any set Q ⊆ S \ T ,
∑
j∈Q yij ≤ vi(Q), and hence yi is a
conservative strategy for player i in terms of her valuation function. Assume otherwise that there exists a
non-empty setQ∗ ⊆ S \T with
∑
j∈Q∗ yij > v(Q
∗). en, by the subadditivity of the valuation function,
the definition of yi and the definition of T , we have that
vi(Q
∗ ∪ T ) ≤ vi(Q
∗) + vi(T ) ≤
∑
j∈Q∗∪T
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj,
which contradicts the maximality of T .
Let y = (yi,b−i), and denote by Y = Y(y) the allocation aer the deviation of player i to the bid
vectoryi. Since pj(y[j]) ≤ yij for every item j ∈ Yi, yij = 0 for every j ∈ Yi\(S\T ), and yij = maxℓ 6=i bℓj
for every j ∈ S \ T , we can bound the total payment of player i as follows:∑
j∈Yi
pj(y[j]) ≤
∑
j∈Yi
yij =
∑
j∈S\T
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj. (1)
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Now, we distinguish between the following two cases. We first assume that the total payment of player
i is within her budget ci. e utility of player i is
ui(y) = vi(Yi)−
∑
j∈Yi
pj(y[j]).
Since Yi ⊇ S \ T , by the monotonicity of vi, we have that vi(Yi) ≥ vi(S \ T ). Combining this with
inequality (1), we obtain
ui(y) ≥ vi(S \ T )−
∑
j∈S\T
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj.
By the definition of T , we have vi(T )−
∑
j∈T maxℓ 6=i bℓj ≤ 0, and hence
ui(y) ≥ vi(S \ T )−
∑
j∈S\T
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj + vi(T )−
∑
j∈T
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj
= vi(S \ T ) + vi(T )−
∑
j∈S
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj .
By the subadditivity of vi, we further have that
vi(S \ T ) + vi(T ) ≥ vi((S \ T ) ∪ T ) = vi(S).
By also using the simple fact that α ≥ min{α, β} for every α, β, we finally obtain the desired inequality:
ui(y) ≥ vi(S)−
∑
j∈S
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj
≥ min{vi(S), ci} −
∑
j∈S
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj.
We now switch to the second case where the total payment of player i exceeds her budget. en, by
the fact that α ≥ min{α, β} for every α, β and inequality (1), we have that
min{vi(S), ci} ≤ ci <
∑
j∈Yi
pj(y[j]) ≤
∑
j∈S\T
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj ≤
∑
j∈S
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj.
is completes the proof of the lemma.
Next, we show the main result of this section. e proof idea is to partition the liquid welfare at
equilibrium into two quantities, one for the players that contribute their budget and one for the players that
contribute their value, and bound each of them separately, using Lemma 1 and the equilibrium condition.
eorem 2. e pure liquid price of anarchy of any auction in S with subadditive valuation functions is at
most 2.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary instance with n players andm items, where player i has a subadditive valua-
tion function vi and a budget ci. Let b be an equilibrium bid matrix that induces the allocationX = X(b)
according to which player i gets a set of items Xi. We also denote by Oi the set given to player i in an
optimal allocationO.
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Let V = {i : vi(X) ≤ ci} be the set of players that contribute their value to the liquid welfare at
equilibrium. We can write the liquid welfare at equilibrium as
LW(X) =
∑
i∈[n]
min{vi(X), ci}
=
∑
i 6∈V
min{vi(X), ci}+
∑
i∈V
min{vi(X), ci}. (2)
In the rest of the proof we will work on these two quantities separately, with the goal of lower-bounding
them in terms of (parts of) the optimal liquid welfare.
For every player i 6∈ V , we have that min{vi(X), ci} = ci ≥ min{vi(Oi), ci}, and therefore, by
summing over all such players, we obtain∑
i 6∈V
min{vi(X), ci} ≥
∑
i 6∈V
min{vi(Oi), ci}. (3)
Now, we focus on players in V . For such a player i, let yi be the bid vector of Lemma 1 with S = Oi.
By the definition of V and the utility definition, we have that
min{vi(X), ci} = vi(X) = ui(b) +
∑
j∈Xi
pj(y[j]) ≥ ui(b).
If the total payment of player i does not exceedher budget ciwhen she deviates toyi, by the equilibrium
condition and Lemma 1, we have that
min{vi(X), ci} ≥ ui(b) ≥ ui(yi,b−i)
≥ min{vi(Oi), ci} −
∑
j∈Oi
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj .
Otherwise, we obtain exactly the same inequality by the fact that ui(b) ≥ 0, and min{vi(Oi), ci} −∑
j∈Oi
maxℓ 6=i bℓj < 0. By summing this inequality over all players in V , we get∑
i∈V
min{vi(X), ci} ≥
∑
i∈V
min{vi(Oi), ci} −
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Oi
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj. (4)
Further, we have ∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Oi
max
ℓ 6=i
bℓj ≤
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈Oi
max
ℓ∈[n]
bℓj
=
∑
j∈[m]
max
ℓ∈[n]
bℓj =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈Xi
bij ≤ LW(X),
where the two equalities follow since bothO andX define (possibly different) partitions of the set of items,
while the last inequality follows by the definition of the liquid welfare, and by the conservative behavior
of player i at equilibrium, which requires that
∑
j∈Xi
bij ≤ min{vi(Xi), ci}. By this, (4) now becomes∑
i∈V
min{vi(X), ci} ≥
∑
i∈V
min{vi(Oi), ci} − LW(X). (5)
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By substituting (3) and (5) into (2), we get
LW(X) ≥
∑
i
min{vi(Oi), ci} − LW(X),
which implies that
LPoA =
LW(O)
LW(X)
≤ 2,
and the proof is now complete.
Since SFPA and SSPA are members of S , we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3. e pure liquid price of anarchy of SFPA and SSPA with subadditive valuation functions is at
most 2.
4 Lower bounds for auctions in S
In this section, we will present lower bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the simple
combinatorial auctions we consider in this paper. Before we dive into the results of this section, we remark
that the bound of 2 is tight for the pure LPoA of SFPA and SSPA with subadditive valuation functions. is
follows by the upper bound of Corollary 3 and the corresponding lower bound presented by Azar et al.
[2017] for the case of additive valuation functions. is extends the tight bound of Azar et al. [2017] for
fractionally-subadditive functions.
Using a simplified version of the instance considered by Azar et al. [2017], we will show with the next
theorem that the lower bound of 2 actually holds for the pure liquid price of stability, and for any simple
combinatorial auction with a payment function that is a convex combination of the bids; to simplify our
discussion, we refer to such auctions as convex auctions.
eorem 4. e pure liquid price of stability of any convex auction in S with additive valuation functions is
at least 2− ε, for any arbitrarily small constant ε > 0.
Proof. Consider an instance with two players and two items. Both players have additive valuation func-
tions so that their values for the individual items are v1(1) = 1, v1(2) = 1, v2(1) = 0, and v2(2) = 1,
while their budgets are c1 = 1 and c2 = 1− ε.
Since v2(1) = 0, player 2 has no incentive to bid more than 0 for item 1. Hence, her main objective is
to acquire item 2, by bidding b22 ∈ [0, 1− ε]. Now, let γ and δ be two arbitrarily small but strictly positive
constants such that γ+δ < ε. Player 1 can acquire item 1 almost for free by bidding b11 = γ, and item 2 by
bidding b12 = b22+δ. is is a valid strategy for player 1 since b11+b12 = γ+b22+δ < γ+1−ε+δ < 1,
which is at most her value for both items v1(1) + v1(2) = 2, and at most her budget c1 = 1. Since the
payment of player 1 is at most b11+b12 < 1 for any simple combinatorial auction with a payment function
that is a convex combination of the bids of the players, her utility is at least 2− b11 − b12 > 1. is is the
maximum possible utility that player 1 can obtain since in any other allocation she gets at most one item
(and thus her utility is at most 1).
Consequently,X = ({1, 2},∅) is the only possible equilibrium allocation, with
LW(X) = min{v1({1, 2}), c1}+min{v2(∅), c2} = 1.
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On the other hand, the optimal allocation isO = ({1}, {2}) with
LW(O) = min{v1(1), c1}+min{v2(2), c2} = 2− ε,
and the lower bound on the LPoS follows.
By eorem 2, and since additive valuation functions form a subclass of subadditive valuation func-
tions, we also obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5. e pure price of stability of any convex auction in S with subadditive valuation functions is
at most 2, and this bound is tight.
We now consider the whole class of simple combinatorial auctions and show a weaker lower bound on
the liquid price of anarchy, which depends on both the number of players and the number of items. e
main idea of the proof is to construct two instances with different private information (valuation functions
and budgets) for the players, which are such that the strategic behavior of the players leads to the same
equilibrium in both instances. Consequently, the auction cannot tell the two instances apart, and fails to
learn the private information of the players.
eorem 6. e pure liquid price of anarchy of any auction in S with subadditive valuation functions is at
least 2− n−1
m
− 1
n
.
Proof. Consider some arbitrary auction in S , and an instance with n players andm ≥ λn items, for some
λ ≥ 2. Let v : 2m → R≥0 be any additive (and, thus, subadditive) function over the powerset of items
such that v(S) =
∑
j∈S v(j) for every S ⊆ [m], and also let V =
∑
j∈[m] v(j). Every player i ∈ [n] has a
valuation function vi = v and budget ci = +∞. Let b be an equilibrium bid matrix of the induced game,
which leads to an allocationX according to which player i gets a set of itemsXi ⊆ [m]. Since the game
is symmetric (all players have the same valuation function and budget), any allocation has the same liquid
welfare, and hence the liquid price of anarchy of this game is equal to 1.
Next, we consider a second instance with the same set of players and items, but withmodified valuation
functions and budgets. Let ℓ = argmini v(Xi) be the player that gets the least value at the equilibriumb of
the previous instance; since v is an additive function and V =
∑
j∈[m] v(j), it must be v(Xℓ) ≤ V/n. In the
new instance, player ℓ has the same valuation function vℓ = v and budget cℓ as before. In contrast, every
other player i 6= ℓ has a modified valuation function v˜i such that v˜i(∅) = 0 and v˜i(S) = v(S) + v(Xi)
for every S 6= ∅, and a modified budget c˜i = v(Xi). Clearly, the valuation function v˜i is subadditive: For
any two non-empty sets of items S and T , by the definition of v˜, and the properties of v (subadditivity and
monotonicity), we have that
v˜i(S ∪ T ) = v(S ∪ T ) + v(Xi) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) + v(Xi) ≤ v˜i(S) + v˜i(T ).
Observe that for any bid matrix y, the utility of player ℓ in the second instance is u˜ℓ(y) = uℓ(y) and the
utility of any other player i 6= ℓ is u˜i(y) = ui(y) + v(Xi). Hence, since the term v(Xi) does not affect
the way that player i selects her strategy (it is viewed as a constant), b must be an equilibrium bid matrix
for the second instance as well, which leads to the same allocation X, according to which each player i
gets the set Xi; observe that the payment of player i 6= ℓ is within her budget c˜i = v(Xi) since she has
non-negative utility at the equilibrium of the first instance, meaning that v(Xi) −
∑
j∈Xi
pj(b[j]) ≥ 0.
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Consequently, the liquid welfare at equilibrium is
LW(X) = min{vℓ(Xℓ), cℓ}+
∑
i 6=ℓ
min{v˜i(Xi), c˜i}
= min{v(Xℓ), cℓ}+
∑
i 6=ℓ
min{2v(Xi), v(Xi)}
=
∑
i∈[n]
v(Xi) = V.
On the other hand, consider the allocationO according to which player ℓ gets them−n+1most valuable
items according to the function v, and every player i 6= ℓ is given one of the remaining items; note that,
sincem ≥ λn, there are enough items to define such an allocation. e liquid welfare ofO is
LW(O) = min{vℓ(Oℓ), cℓ}+
∑
i 6=ℓ
min{v˜i(Oi), c˜i}
= min{v(Oℓ),+∞}+
∑
i 6=ℓ
min{v(Oi) + v(Xi), v(Xi)}
= v(Oℓ) +
∑
i 6=ℓ
v(Xi). (6)
Since v(Oℓ) ≥ (m−n+1) ·v(j) for each j ∈ [m]\Oℓ and |[m]\Oℓ| = n−1, we have that v([m]\Oℓ) ≤
n−1
m−n+1 · v(Oℓ). By this, we obtain
V = v(Oℓ) + v([m] \Oℓ) ≤
(
1 +
n− 1
m− n+ 1
)
v(Oℓ)
⇔ v(Oℓ) ≥
(
1−
n− 1
m
)
· V.
Moreover, by the definition of V and since v(Xℓ) ≤ V/n, we have∑
i 6=ℓ
v(Xi) = V − v(Xℓ) ≥
(
1−
1
n
)
V.
Substituting the last two expressions into (6), we get
LW(O) ≥ v(Oℓ) +
∑
i 6=ℓ
v(Xi) ≥
(
2−
n− 1
m
−
1
n
)
V.
erefore, the liquid price of anarchy is at least
LW(O)
LW(X)
≥ 2−
n− 1
m
−
1
n
.
as desired.
By considering instances in which the number of items is large (tends to infinity), we recover the
bound of 2 − 1/n proved by Caragiannis and Voudouris [2018] for single divisible resource allocation
mechanisms. Essentially, we can interpret eorem 6 as a discrete version of the corresponding theorem
of Caragiannis and Voudouris [2018], which shows how the bound depends not only on the number of
players, but also on the number of items. Consequently, it leaves room for improvement for special cases
where the number of items is bounded.
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5 More complex auctions
So far, we have focused on auctions that greedily allocate the items, by simply looking at who submits the
highest bid for every individual item, and showed that no such auction can achieve full efficiency. Naturally,
one might wonder whether taking into account the bids over all items while coming up with the allocation
can improve the liquid price of anarchy and stability. In this section, we answer this negatively for the
well-known VCG auction [Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973].
Let us first give a brief description of the auction. Given as input a matrix b = (bi(S))i∈[n],S∈2[m] that
specifies the bid of every player i for every possible bundle of items S, VCG computes an allocationX that
maximizes the social welfare according to b:
X ∈ argmax
Y
∑
i∈[n]
bi(Y).
en, the payment pi(b) of player i who is allocated bundle Xi is the difference between the maximum
possible social welfare that could have been achieved if i did not participate and the social welfare of all
players besides i forX, always according to the given bids:
pi(b) = max
Y
∑
ℓ 6=i
bℓ(Y)−
∑
ℓ 6=i
bℓ(X).
In the no-budget seing, VCG is known to be truthful (in the sense that it is a dominant strategy for
every player to bid her true value for every possible bundle of items) and also achieves full efficiency.
However, when the players have budget constraints, VCG is no longer truthful [Dobzinski and Paes Leme,
2014], and as we will show with the next theorem, it is not fully efficient either.
eorem 7. e pure liquid price of stability of VCG with additive valuation functions is at least 2 − ε, for
any arbitrarily small constant ε > 0.
Proof. Let α < ε be a parameter, and consider an instance with two players and two items. e valuation
functions of the players are additive so that their values for the individual items are v1(1) = 1, v1(2) =
1− α, v2(1) = 0, and v2(2) = 1, while their budgets are c1 = 1 and c2 = 1− ε.
Before we argue about the liquid price of stability, observe that if both players were truthful, then
player 1 would get item 1 and player 2 would get item 2 as this is the allocation that maximizes the social
welfare. However, the payment of player 2 would be equal to 1 − α, which is the difference between the
value of player 1 for both items and her value for only item 1. Since α < ε, this means that player 2 would
need to pay an amount that exceeds her budget c2 = 1− ε. Hence, she would get utility −∞ and would
want to deviate to a smaller bid for item 2.
Similarly to the proof of eorem 4, we can argue that the only possible equilibrium allocation isX =
({1, 2},∅). To see this, observe that since the value of player 2 is 0 for item 1, she will bid b2 ∈ [0, 1 − ε]
for the singleton set {2} and the set {1, 2}, and 0 for the singleton set {1}. Now, player 1 can bid 0 for both
singleton sets {1} and {2}, and b1 = 1 > b2 for {1, 2}. Consequently, the social welfare is maximized by
allocating both items to player 1, who has to pay b2. Since the utility of player 1 for any other allocation is
at most 1 (she gets at most one item), and her utility now is 2−α−b2 ≥ 1+ε−α > 1, player 1maximizes
her utility,X is the only possible equilibrium allocation, and the bound on the LPoS follows.
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6 Known budgets
In this section, we no longer assume that budgets are private. Instead, we consider the case where the
budgets are common knowledge, and the auction can take them into account while defining the payments
of the winners. Still, even with this extra power, no simple combinatorial auction can achieve optimal
liquid welfare. e proof of the following theorem is similar to that of eorem 6, but uses instances with
two players and the same budgets, since these are now assumed to be known. Inevitably, this leads to a
somewhat weaker bound. Similarly toeorem 6, the bound can be interpreted as a discrete version of the
4/3 bound of Caragiannis and Voudouris [2018] for the class of the so-called budget-aware single divisible
resource allocation mechanisms.
eorem 8. e pure liquid price of anarchy of any auction in S with subadditive valuation functions is at
least 43 −
2
3m , even when the budgets are known.
Proof. Consider some arbitrary auction in S , and an instance with two players and m ≥ 2 items. Let
v : 2m → R≥0 be any additive (and, thus, subadditive) function over the powerset of items such that
v(S) =
∑
j∈S v(j) for every S ⊆ [m], and also let V =
∑
j∈[m] v(j). e valuation functions of the two
players are v1 = v2 = v and their budgets are c1 = c2 = V . Let b be an equilibrium bid matrix of the
induced game, which leads to an allocationX according to which player 1 gets setX1 and player 2 gets set
X2. Without loss of generality, assume that v(X1) ≤ v(X2), and hence v(X1) ≤ V/2. Since the game is
symmetric (all players have the same valuation function and budget), all allocations have the same liquid
welfare, and hence the liquid price of anarchy of this game is equal to 1.
Next, we consider a second instance with the same set of players, items, and budgets, but with modified
valuation functions. In the new instance, player 1 has the same valuation function v1 = v as in the previous
instance, while player 2 has a modified valuation function v˜2 such that v˜2(∅) = 0 and v˜2(S) = v(S) + V
for every S 6= ∅; it should be obvious that v˜2 is subadditive.
Since V is only a constant term in themodified valuation function of player 2, bmust be an equilibrium
bid matrix for the second instance as well. is leads to the same allocationX, according to which player
1 gets setX1 and player 2 gets setX2; the payments of both players are within their budgets since this is
true in the first instance and their budgets did not change. e liquid welfare at equilibrium is
LW(X) = min{v1(X1), c1}+min{v˜2(X2), c2}
= min{v(X1), V }+min{v(X2) + V, V }
= v(X1) + V
≤
3V
2
.
On the other hand, consider the allocationO according towhich player 1 gets them−1most valuable items
according to the function v, and player 2 gets the remaining item. We clearly have that v(O2) ≤
1
m−1v(O1)
and
V = v(O1) + v(O2) ≤
(
1 +
1
m− 1
)
v(O1)
⇔ v(O1) ≥
(
1−
1
m
)
V.
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e liquid welfare ofO is
LW(O) = min{v1(O1), c1}+min{v˜2(O2), c2}
= min{v(O1), V }+min{v(O2) + V, V }
= v(O1) + V
≥
(
2−
1
m
)
V.
erefore, the liquid price of anarchy is at least
LW(O)
LW(X)
≥
4
3
−
2
3m
,
as desired.
7 Conclusions and possible extensions
In this paper, we studied the efficiency of a class of simple combinatorial auctions, which allocate each item
separately to strategic players with subadditive valuation functions and budgets. We showed tight bounds
on the LPoA and LPoS for convex simple auctions, and complemented it with (weaker) lower bounds for
every simple auction, for themore complex VCG auction, and also for simple auctions that may have access
to the budgets of the players. Even though we painted an almost complete picture of the LPoA and LPoS
landscape for these auctions, there are still many interesting directions to be explored.
In terms of our results, the lower bound of 2− 1/n− (n− 1)/m for private budgets (eorem 6) and
the lower bound of 4/3 − 2/(3m) for known budgets (eorem 8), leave open the possibility of simple
combinatorial auctions with efficiency guarantees that are strictly beer than the upper bound of 2 which
we proved in eorem 2 for special cases, depending on the number of players or items. In particular, is
there a beer simple auction for the fundamental case where there are only two players? What about a
constant number of players and known budgets?
Furthermore, in this paper we focused exclusively on the case of pure equilibria. Azar et al. [2017]
did focus on more general equilibrium concepts, but were only able to prove non-tight constant bounds
on the liquid price of anarchy for SFPA and SSPA with agents that have additive valuation functions.
Consequently, an important avenue for future research is to consider more general equilibrium concepts
and valuation functions, and bound the liquid price of anarchy and stability for a broader class of simple
auctions. More concretely, what happens in the case of convex auctions with (fractionally-)subadditive
agents and Bayes-Nash equilibria?
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